【導讀】美聯(lián)儲宣布將退出QE3，是不是太早了？詳見下文。
Free exchange
自由貿(mào)易
Early retirement
提前退休
Ending quantitative easing may be penny-wise, pound-foolish
退出量化寬松可能因小失大
Nov 1st 2014 | From the print edition of The Economist
譯者：forestmoon
ON OCTOBER 29th the Federal Reserve said it would end “QE3”: the programme of asset purchases it first announced in September 2012 and began shrinking last December. Quantitative easing, or the buying of assets with newly created money, has been the workhorse of monetary policy since rich-world interest rates fell almost to zero in 2008-09. Despite its expansive use since then, many still see it as an exotic and possibly dangerous monetary tool. They raise three pressing questions: did it work, did it have unacceptable side effects, and was the Fed right to stop?
10月29日 美聯(lián)儲宣布它將結束“QE3（第三輪量化寬松）”：一項資產(chǎn)購置計劃，它在2012年9月第一次宣布開始執(zhí)行，并于去年12月開始收縮。量化寬松，或者說用新創(chuàng)造的貨幣購買資產(chǎn)，自從2008~2009年期間富裕國家的利率幾乎掉至0時，已經(jīng)成為貨幣政策的主力。盡管自從那時起它便被廣泛使用，但仍被認為是一項獨特并且可能危險的貨幣工具。他們提出了三項緊迫的問題：它有效嗎，它是否有可接受的副作用，美聯(lián)儲結束它的決策是否正確？
Though QE is often described as an “unconventional” form of monetary policy (as opposed to mundane adjustments to interest rates), it has actually been in use for some time. The Federal Reserve tried it from 1932 to 1936, and the Bank of Japan in the early 2000s. Both have used it again since the financial crisis, along with the Bank of England.
雖然QE經(jīng)常被描述為一個“沒有爭議的”貨幣政策形式（相比較于對利率的普通的調(diào)整），它實際上已經(jīng)被用了不少次了。美聯(lián)儲從1932~1936年期間就曾試圖用過，日本銀行在21世紀初期也曾用過。這兩個自金融危機伊始便又一次和英格蘭銀行一起采用了。
QE is thought to work in a few ways. Early in the recession asset purchases were primarily intended to ease credit by directing a firehose of liquidity into fearful markets. Other effects became more important over time, such as portfolio rebalancing. A bank that has sold bonds to the Fed will typically wish to spend the proceeds to buy some other asset. When banks buy new securities, the newly created money flows through the system, raising asset prices and reducing interest rates. That, in turn, should boost demand by making investment more attractive. If banks buy foreign assets, that may weaken the exchange rate, giving a boost to exporters. Finally, QE is also thought to work as a signal: research suggests that it reinforces central banks’ policy guidance, making promises to keep rates low more credible, for instance.
QE被認為從以下幾個方面其效果。在衰退的初始階段，資產(chǎn)購置的初衷是為了通過在充滿恐懼情緒的市場中布置一個流動性的消防帶來放松信貸。其它的效果將隨著時間推移變得更加重要，比如，資產(chǎn)組合的再平衡。一個把債券賣個美聯(lián)儲的銀行，很典型地，希望能夠花費這個債券衍生出的收益來購買其它資產(chǎn)。當銀行買了新的有價證券時，新創(chuàng)造的貨幣將流向整個體系，提升資產(chǎn)價格，降低利率水平。這又進一步通過使投資更有吸引力來提升需求。如果銀行買了國外的資產(chǎn)，這將降低匯率，刺激出口者。最后，QE也被視為一個信號：研究表明，它增強了中央銀行的政策指導，例如，使維持低利率的承諾更為可信。
QE’s detractors point out that central banks around the rich world have expanded their balance-sheets by trillions of dollars in recent years (see chart), yet are still nurturing lacklustre recoveries. Nonetheless, there is a consensus among researchers that QE has indeed lowered borrowing costs, and thus increased both economic output and inflation, as its advocates intended. In both America and Britain, for instance, several studies have concluded that it helped to lower interest rates. Those declines are generally held to have boosted economic growth. Recent work by Martin Weale and Tomasz Wieladek of the Bank of England found that for every 1% of GDP the Fed spent on bonds, both real output and inflation rose by about a third of a percentage point. Given how close so many economies now are to outright deflation, even a small boost to inflation is not to be sneered at.
QE的批評者們支出，富國的中央銀行這些年已經(jīng)數(shù)以十億美元計地擴展了他們的資產(chǎn)負債表（見圖），卻仍然在給毫無生機的恢復過程輸送養(yǎng)分。盡管如此，研究者中已經(jīng)形成了一個共識，即QE確實降低了借貸成本，并因此增加了經(jīng)濟的產(chǎn)出和通脹，正如它的鼓吹者們宣稱的那樣。比如，在美國和英國，不少研究已經(jīng)證實，它有益于降低利率，這一般可以促進經(jīng)濟增長。英格蘭銀行的Martin Weale 和 Tomasz Wieladek 的最新研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，美聯(lián)儲在債券上花費的每1%的GDP，不論實際產(chǎn)出還是通脹，都將提升大約0.3個百分點?？紤]到那么多經(jīng)濟體如此地接近于完全通縮，哪怕一個小小的通脹提升都不可小覷。
Why haven’t central banks done more in that case? Excessive optimism is one reason; the Fed, for example, has repeatedly overestimated how quickly the American economy was likely to grow. The fear of possible side effects has also stayed central bankers’ hands. In some cases, those are subsiding: claims that the new trillions coursing through the economy would lead to hyper-inflation no longer seem credible, given how static prices remain. Central bankers are also increasingly confident that their pneumatic balance-sheets will not interfere with conventional monetary policy. The Fed, for instance, has begun paying interest on the excess reserves banks keep with it. By raising that rate it can attract extra reserves and thus curb bank lending.
為什么中央銀行沒有在那種情況下做得更多呢？過度樂觀主義是一個原因；例如，美聯(lián)儲不停地高估美國經(jīng)濟體有可能增長多么迅速的可能性。對有可能產(chǎn)生的副作用的擔心同樣使央行投鼠忌器。在一些案例中，這些論點正在平息：宣稱新的萬億注入經(jīng)濟體將導致惡性通貨膨脹，在價格如此穩(wěn)定的情況下，已經(jīng)變得不那么可信。中央銀行正在對他們的充氣式膨脹的資產(chǎn)負債表將與傳統(tǒng)的貨幣政策不沖突變得更加有信心。例如，美聯(lián)儲已經(jīng)開始對銀行持有的超額準備金支付利息。提升這個利率，它將吸引更多的儲備金并因此控制銀行信貸。
The worry that QE is generating dangerous financial instability has been more persistent. Jeremy Stein, who served on the Fed’s Board of Governors from 2012 to 2014, thinks that persistently low interest rates have caused investors to embrace frighteningly risky assets in a search for yield. If QE spurs the construction of a financial house of cards, the argument runs, its eventual collapse may hurt more than QE ever helped.
對QE是否產(chǎn)生危險的金融動蕩的擔憂則更為持久。曾于2012~2014年在美聯(lián)儲委員會效力的Jeremy Stein，認為持續(xù)的低利率將導致投資者更熱衷于令人害怕的高風險資產(chǎn)以追逐利潤。爭論稱，如果QE刺激了這種不切實際的金融體系的建造，它將最終坍塌，并造成遠比QE帶來的好處多得多的危害。
Risk-maker or risk-taker?
These fears will be difficult to judge until more time has passed, yet there are good reasons to believe they are overstated. Most central bankers insist they have the regulatory tools to keep excessive risk-taking in check (although their recent record in that respect is inglorious). Recent research by Gabriel Chodorow-Reich of Harvard University finds that the “reach for yield” QE has prompted has been modest relative to its benefits. Asset purchases helped recapitalise ailing banks, he reckons, and higher asset values have dampened the incentive to make risky bets. Anyway, it is important to weigh QE’s risks against those of other policies. Were the European Central Bank to resort to QE, it might lead to undue risk-taking, but if the policy also reduced the odds of a catastrophic break-up of the euro it would be worthwhile.
風險制造者還是風險承擔者？
短期內(nèi)對這些擔心難以判斷，但有充分理由相信它們被夸大了。許多中央銀行堅持他們在核算中有監(jiān)管工具以避免過度的風險承擔（雖然他們在這方面過去的記錄是不光彩的）。哈佛大學的Gabriel Chodorow-Reich最近的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，QE促進的“拿來收益”相比于其好處，已經(jīng)比較適度了。他還認為，資產(chǎn)購置幫助狀態(tài)不佳的銀行重新積累資本，且更高的資產(chǎn)價值幫助弱化做高風險賭注的動機。歐洲央行是將求助于QE，它可能導致超預期的風險承擔，但如果政策也降低了歐元崩潰風險的概率，那么也是值得的。
Critics’ third complaint is that QE raises inequality. Asset purchases, naturally, raise asset prices. Since the rich own most financial assets, QE tends to increase inequality through the “portfolio” channel. Yet to the extent that QE boosts growth, it reduces inequality, for joblessness is regressive: poorer workers suffer higher unemployment rates and more significant loss of income in weak economies. Higher inflation also makes debts easier to bear, because they can be repaid with money that is worth less. Since borrowers tend to be poorer than creditors, QE diminishes inequality in that way too. Recent research suggests that tight monetary policy tends to raise inequality while expansionary policy reduces it.
批評者的第三個抱怨是，QE加劇了不平等。資產(chǎn)購置，一般提升了資產(chǎn)價格。因為富人擁有大多數(shù)的金融資產(chǎn)，QE傾向于通過資產(chǎn)組合的渠道加劇不平等。然而在某種程度上，QE促進了增長，也減少了不平等，因為失業(yè)更有危害性：脆弱經(jīng)濟體中貧窮的勞動者遭受了更高的失業(yè)率，以及更為顯著的收入減少。更高的通脹也使得負債更容易忍受，因為這些負債可以被價值更少的錢來償還。既然出借者變得比借入者更窮，那么QE從這個意義上也減少了不平等。最近的研究表明更緊的貨幣政策傾向于提升不平等，同時擴張性的政策將減弱。
If QE works and its potential costs are overstated, should the Fed not keep at it? Those cheering its demise note that growth has been strong and steady for most of 2014, and that unemployment, at 5.9%, is near its long-term average. Yet history suggests that leaving QE behind is never simple. As long as interest rates remain near zero any nasty new development will force the Fed to resume it or stand by while the economy deteriorates. And low and falling expectations of inflation suggest that markets doubt the Fed’s ability to leave Japan-style stagnation behind. A premature exit from QE3 is a good way to make sure there is a QE4.
如果QE有效果并且它的潛在成本被夸大了，那么美聯(lián)儲是否需要繼續(xù)施行呢？那些對QE終止而歡呼的人發(fā)現(xiàn)，增長在2014年的大多數(shù)時間變得強有力，并且失業(yè)率，5.9%的水平，已經(jīng)接近于它的長期平均水平。但歷史表明把QE放在身后從來不是簡單的。既然利率保持在0附近，任何令人不快的新進展將逼迫美聯(lián)儲繼續(xù)實行，或站在一邊看著經(jīng)濟垮掉。并且，對通脹的低且持續(xù)下降的預期也表明，市場懷疑美聯(lián)儲拜托日本式滯漲的能力。一個QE3的過早的退出，是一個很好的辦法確認還將有一個QE4.
【譯者注】
量化寬松政策：簡單理解就是“印錢”。其中量化指的是擴大一定數(shù)量的貨幣發(fā)行，寬松就是減少銀行儲備必須注資的壓力。當銀行和金融機構的有價證券被央行收購時，新發(fā)行的錢幣便被成功地投入到私有銀行體系。
2014年10月29日，美國結束了維持兩年之久第三輪量化寬松政策，并重申將會在相當長一段時間保持利率在當前低位。分析人士普遍認為，美國退出QE可能會促使國際資本回流美國，但對中國資本流動不會產(chǎn)生太大影響，中國央行穩(wěn)健的貨幣政策基調(diào)不會有太大改變。（來自百度百科）
聯(lián)系客服
